Encoding and decoding models are widely used in systems, cognitive, and computational neuroscience to make sense of brain-activity data. However, the interpretation of their results requires care. Decoding models can help reveal whether particular information is present in a brain region in a format the decoder can exploit. Encoding models make comprehensive predictions about representational spaces. In the context of sensory systems, encoding models enable us to test and compare brain-computational models, and thus directly constrain computational theory. Encoding and decoding models typically include fitted linear-model components. Sometimes the weights of the fitted linear combinations are interpreted as reflecting, in an encoding model, the contribution of different sensory features to the representation or, in a decoding model, the contribution of different measured brain responses to a decoded feature. Such interpretations can be problematic when the predictor variables or their noise components are correlated and when priors (or penalties) are used to regularize the fit. Encoding and decoding models are evaluated in terms of their generalization performance. The correct interpretation depends on the level of generalization a model achieves (e.g. to new response measurements for the same stimuli, to new stimuli from the same population, or to stimuli from a different population). Significant decoding or encoding performance of a single model (at whatever level of generality) does not provide strong constraints for theory. Many models must be tested and inferentially compared for analyses to drive theoretical progress.
Decoding models: revealing information and its format
Decoding is sometimes motivated by the goal to "read the brain" or "crack the neural code" (Cox & Savoy 2003) . This sense of revealing a mystery and gaining insight into hidden information drives the imagination of scientists and lay people alike. When "decrypting" the brain is implicitly equated with understanding its computational mechanisms, we go astray: Decoding reveals the products, not the process of brain computation (Box 1). However, it is a useful tool for testing whether a brain region contains a particular kind of information in a particular format ( A simple example of a decoding model is a linear classifier that takes a measured brain-activity pattern as input and outputs a class label (say "cat" and "dog"), revealing which of two stimuli (say a particular image of a cat and a particular image of a dog) elicited the response pattern ( Figure 1 ). A linear classifier may achieve this by computing a weighted sum of the measured responses and imposing a threshold to decide which label to return (see Mur et al. 2009 for a gentle introduction). The weights are set to maximize the accuracy of the decoding on a training data set. If decoding succeeds reliably on a test data set, then the region must contain information about the decoded variable (the binary stimulus distinction here).
Decoding provides a statistically advantageous way of testing for stimulus information
In the two-stimulus example, all the linear decoder shows is that the two images elicit distinct response patterns. This means that there is mutual information between stimulus and response. To demonstrate mutual information, we could have used an encoding model or a multivariate test of difference between the response patterns elicited by the two stimuli (e.g. multivariate analysis of variance), instead of a decoding model (Kriegeskorte 2011 ). However, a univariate encoding model (as typically used in the literature) would have less sensitivity, because it does not account for the noise correlations between different response channels. A multivariate analysis of variance would account for the noise correlations, but might have less specificity. In fact, it might fail to control false-positives at the nominal level if its assumptions of multivariate normality did not hold (as is often the case), making it invalid as a statistical test. Decoding provides a natural approach to modelling the noise correlations (e.g. using a multivariate normal model as in the Fisher linear discriminant), without relying on the model assumptions for the validity of the test: Violations of the decoding model assumptions will hurt decoding performance. We, thus, err on the safe side of concluding that there is no information about the stimuli in the responses. In sum, it is not the direction of the decoding model ("brain reading") that makes it a compelling test for information, but the statistical nature of the problem (noise correlations) and the fact that decoders are tested on independent data.
Linear decodability indicates "explicit" information
For decoding to succeed, the information must be present in the brain region in a format that the decoder can exploit. Linear decoders, the most widely used class, require that the distributions of patterns be linearly separable to some extent. This is a weakness in the sense that we might fail to detect information present in the code in a more complex format. However, it is a strength in that we have more specific information about the format of the information we do detect. The simpler the decoder, the more focused its sensitivity will be. From the perspective of understanding the brain computations, it is attractive to use decoding operations that single neurons can implement. These include linear readout, but also simple nonlinear forms of readout such as radial basis function decoding. Linear decodability indicates that a downstream neuron receiving input from a sufficient portion of the pattern, could read out the information in question (DiCarlo & Cox 2007) . Information amenable to direct readout by downstream neurons is sometimes referred to as "explicit" in the code (Kriegeskorte 2011 , DiCarlo et al. 2012 , Hong et al. 2016 ).
Figure 1 | Linear encoding and decoding models. (A)
Encoding and decoding model the relationship between stimuli and responses in opposite directions. An encoding model (top) predicts brain responses as a linear combination of stimulus properties (black circles). A decoding model (bottom) predicts stimulus properties as a linear combination of brain responses. (B) Example of a linear decoding model using a 2dimensional feature space consisting of two voxels. Voxel 1 contains relevant information about which of two classes (green, blue) the stimulus belongs to. Voxel 2 contains no information about the stimulus class. The two dimensions jointly define the linear discriminatory boundary. Note that the weights assigned to each voxel are defined by the vector w, which is orthogonal to the decision boundary. Because the noise is correlated between the voxels, a linear decoder will assign significant negative weight to voxel 2, using this voxel (which contains only noise) to cancel the noise in the voxel which contains signal. As a result, interpreting the absolute weights of linear decoders requires care and additional analyses.
The level of generalization beyond the training set must be considered when interpreting a decoding result Any fitting procedure will overfit (i.e. fit aspects of the noise) to some extent. This can lead to high accuracy on the training set, even if the response patterns contain no information about the stimulus. Decoders therefore need to be tested for generalization to independent data (Hastie et al. 2009 . In our example, we might test the decoder on an independent set of response measurements for the same two particular images of a cat and a dog. If decoding accuracy on this independent test set is significant, we can reject the null hypothesis that the response patterns contain no information about the stimulus (Mur et al. 2009 , Pereira et al. 2009 ).
However, detecting information about which of two images has been presented tells us almost nothing about the nature of the representation. The two images must have distinct response patterns in the retina and V1 (low-level representations) as well as in the visuo-semantic regions of the ventral stream (high-level representations). We would therefore expect a linear decoder to work in any of these regions. This reflects the fact that all the regions contain image information. Given just two images, we have no empirical basis for characterizing the nature of the code (see Kriegeskorte et al. 2007 for a study limited by this drawback). In order to learn whether the region we are decoding from contains a low-level image representation or a high-level categorical representation, we can train the decoder on one set of cat and dog images and test it on another set of images of different cats and dogs (Anzellotti et al. 2014 , Freedman et al. 2002 , Kriegeskorte 2011 ) .
Although the retina must contain the information distinguishing all cats from all dogs, the two categories are expected to be hopelessly entangled in the retinal representation and therefore not amenable to linear decoding (DiCarlo & Cox 2007) . Linear decodability with generalization to different cats and dogs would indicate that cats and dogs correspond to linearly separable subspaces in the representation.
Note that it is not sufficient to train on a large set of particular images of cats and dogs and then test on new measurements for these images. The linear decoder has many parameters (one for each response channel) and is expected to overfit not just to the noise, but also to the particular images presented. Even for the retinal representation, we therefore expect a cat/dog decoder to generalize to new measurements. To support the interpretation that "cats" and "dogs" are linearly separable in the representation, we must test the linear decoder for generalization to different cats and dogs.
Testing decoders for cross-generalization between different domains is useful to address a host of questions regarding the stability of representations, for example between imagery and perception (Stokes et al. 2009 , Cichy et al. 2012 ) and between different latencies after stimulus onset (King & Dehaene 2014) .
A decoder may discriminate more than two categories. It might decode a continuous variable (e.g. the orientation of the stimulus; Kamitani & Tong 2005), or it might output a complex multidimensional description. The most ambitious variant of decoding is stimulus reconstruction, which provides a richer picture of the information a brain region contains about the stimulus Stimulus reconstruction is a particularly impressive feat of decoding for two related reasons. First, the space of outputs is much richer, so the decoder reveals more information (discriminating among more possible stimuli). Second, a more challenging level of generalization is typically required for the decoder to discriminate among this richer set of possible stimuli, because there are usually severe limitations on the number of stimuli that the decoder can be directly trained on. Successful generalization suggests that the structure of the model captures something about the code that enables generalization far beyond the training set.
To the extent that stimulus reconstruction, when applied to novel stimuli that the model has not been trained on, successfully specifies close matches within a rich space of reconstruction targets (e.g. pixel images), the analysis indicates that the code contains rich information about the stimulus. An extreme example of this would be a decoder that can precisely reconstruct arbitrary natural or unnatural images from their representation in V1. This would indicate that V1 encodes the image precisely and that the encoding is not restricted to natural images. In fact, this has never been shown for V1 and would be puzzling, because we expect visual representations to be specialized for natural stimuli.
In order to improve the appearance of reconstructions of natural stimuli, it is attractive to use a prior over the possible outputs of the decoder. For example, we might constrain the model to output an image whose low-level or high-level statistics match natural images. We may constrain the decoder more strongly, by limiting it to output only actual natural images. This constraint could be implemented using a restricted set of target images (Naselaris et al. 2009 ) or a generative model of natural images (Goodfellow et al. 2014 ). In either case, the quality of the reconstruction will reflect a combination of the information provided by the brain region and the information contributed by the prior. A complicated prior therefore also complicates the interpretation of the reconstruction results: good looking reconstructions no longer indicate that all the detail they provide is encoded in the brain region. The reconstruction has to be compared to the presented stimulus, and the complexity of the output space (which is reduced by the prior over the outputs) needs to be considered in the interpretation.
An important question is what we can learn from stimulus reconstructions. The goal to learn about the content and format of the code may not be ideally served by striving for the most natural looking reconstruction.
Decoding models predicting behavioral responses from brain responses can be interpreted as brain-computational models
Decoding is usually used as a tool of analysis that reveals aspects of the content and format of the information encoded in a brain region. The decoding model, thus, is not interpreted as a model of brain computation. In the context of sensory systems, a decoder maps from brain responses to stimuli. Since stimulus processing by the brain operates in the opposite direction, it is difficult to interpret a decoder as a model of brain information processing. However, if a decoder is used to predict behavioral responses, e.g. reaction times and errors on individual trials of performance of some task, then the decoder can be interpreted as a model (at a high level of abstraction) of the brain computations generating the behavioral responses from the encoding of the stimuli in the decoded brain region 
Box 1: Decoding Models: Benefits and Limitations
Decoding provides an intuitive and compelling demonstration of the presence of information in a brain region. Although the concept of "brain reading" is attractive to the public imagination, it detracts from the scientific advances that decoding affords. Decoding models have brought several substantial advances that are unrelated to the seductive idea of brain reading:  They have enabled researchers to look into the regions and reveal their representational content, rather than just their overall level of activation 24 .
 They have enabled cognitive neuroscience to exploit the fine-grained multivariate information present in modern imaging data 90 . Before the advent of decoding, dominant brain mapping techniques required smoothing of the data, treating fine-grained information as noise. The multivariate modelling of local patterns also brought locally multivariate noise models to the literature, which greatly enhance the information that can be drawn from neuroimaging data 91 .
 They have strengthened the use of independent test data in the analysis of brain activity 155 . Demonstrating significant information with independent test data ensures that violations of model assumptions lead to conservative errors, making significant results less likely.
Decoding models are limited in several ways:
 They cannot in general be interpreted as models of brain-information processing. In the context of sensory systems, decoding models operate in the wrong direction, capturing the inverse of the brain's processing of the stimuli. If the decoded variable is a behavioral response, then direction of information flow matches between model and brain. However, such applications are rare. Moreover, the most successful applications of decoding in the literature rely on linear decoders, which are useful to reveal explicit information, but cannot capture the complex nonlinear computations we wish to understand.
 Decoder weight maps are difficult to interpret ( Figure 2 ) because voxels uninformattive by themselves can receive large weights when they help cancel noise and because the weights are codetermined by the data and the prior, and the fitting procedure might select one but not the other of two essentially equally informative voxels.
 Decoding results provide only weak constraints on computational mechanisms. Knowing that a particular kind of information is present provides some evidence for an against alternative theories about what the region does. However, it does not exhaustively characterize the representation, let alone reveal the underlying computations.
Encoding models: testing comprehensive representational predictions
Encoding models attempt to predict brain response patterns from descriptions of the experimental conditions ( Figure 1A Brain-computational encoding models can be tested by predicting raw measurements, representational dissimilarities, or the activity-profiles distribution A brain-computational encoding model must be able to process raw stimuli and predict their representations in the brain. The stimulus processing is typically nonlinear; it could consist in a set of hand-engineered features computed from the stimuli or in a neural network model trained on some task. How can we evaluate a high-dimensional representation in a brain-computational encoding model with brain-activity data, when the units of the model may not correspond oneto-one to the measured channels of brain activity?
One approach is to predict the raw measurements ( To achieve this, we can fit a linear model that maps from the outputs of the nonlinear encoder thought to capture the brain computations (e.g. a layer of a neural network model processing the stimuli) to each measured response channel, e.g. each neuron or fMRI voxel in the region we would like to understand. The linear model will capture which units of the nonlinear encoding model best predict each response channel. It can be interpreted as capturing the sampling and averaging that occurs in the measurement of brain activity. A neuronal recording array, for example, will capture a sample of neurons, and fMRI will give us measurements akin to local spatiotemporal averages at regular grid locations. For each response channel, the linear model will have a parameter for each nonlinear feature (e.g. each unit of the neural network layer). Fitting these parameters requires substantial training data and normally also a prior on the parameters (e.g. a 0-mean Gaussian prior as is implicit to fitting with an L2 penalty).
Instead of predicting the raw measurements, we can use an nonlinear encoding model to predict to what extent different stimuli are dissimilar in the representation, an approach called representational similarity analysis (RSA; Kriegeskorte et al. 2008 ). The pairwise dissimilarities of the multivariate response patterns representing the stimuli can be summarized in a representational dissimilarity matrix (RDM). If the dissimilarity for each pair of stimuli is measured using the Euclidean distance, the RDM characterizes the geometry of the set of points in the multivariate response space that correspond to the stimuli. Using the crossnobis (crossvalidated Mahalanobis) distance (where the covariance captures the noise correlations among responses), the RDM provides a full characterization of the linearly decodable information in the representational space (Diedrichsen & Kriegeskorte 2017 ). Comparing representations in models and brains at the level of RDMs obviates the need for fitting a linear model to predict each measured response (thus reducing the need for training data) and enables the analysis to naturally handle noise correlations between responses (which are typically ignored when encoding models separately predict each of the measured response channels).
A third approach to the evaluation of encoding models is to predict the distribution of activity profiles. In pattern component modelling (PCM, Diedrichsen et al. 2011 ), this distribution is characterized by the second moment of the activity profiles. Like the RDM, this is a stimulus-bystimulus summary statistic of the stimulus-response matrix. Each entry of the second-moment matrix corresponds to the inner product between two response patterns.
All three approaches test hypotheses about the representational space that are captured by the second moment of the activity profiles (Diedrichsen & Kriegeskorte 2017). To understand this, consider the fact that a linear encoding model using a Gaussian prior on the weights predicts a Gaussian distribution of activity profiles. The predicted distribution of activity profiles is fully captured by its second moment. For representational similarity analysis, similarly, the RDM is a function of the second moment of the activity profiles. This core mathematical commonality between the methods notwithstanding, each is best suited for a particular set of questions.
Linear models predicting raw measurements lend themselves to univariate mapping, revealing which units of the nonlinear encoding model best predict each measured location. RSA lends itself to characterizing the geometry of the representational space, naturally handles noise correlations among responses, and reduces the need for training data. PCM can have greater sensitivity for adjudicating among models than the other two methods, at the expense of relying on stronger assumptions. The three methods are best viewed as part of a single toolbox of representational model analyses, whose elements can be combined as needed to address particular questions.
The level of generalization beyond the training set must be considered when interpreting an encoding result Encoders, like decoders, are tested by evaluating how well they predict independent data, whether the predicted quantities are the raw brain-activity measurements, the representational dissimilarity matrix, or the second-moment matrix of the activity profiles. For encoders, as for decoders, the interpretation depends on both the prediction accuracy and the level of generalization beyond the training set that the model achieves.
Encoding models typically require the fitting of parameters, so overfitting needs to be accounted for in any inferential procedure. In the simplest type of univariate linear encoding model, we can rely on Gaussian assumptions and perform inference without a separate test set (e.g. Friston et al. 1994 ). However, more interesting models require independent test sets, for example when parameters are fitted using priors over the weights and when the model is a brain-computational model to be tested for generalization to new conditions.
A key consideration is how much flexibility to allow in fitting each model representation to a brain representation. One extreme is to allow no flexibility and assume that the model representation precisely predicts the geometry of the representational space (Kriegeskorte et al. 2008 ). This case is most naturally handled by RSA and PCM, but could also be implemented with linear encoders by using a prior that prevents any distortion of the representational geometry. The lowest level of generalization beyond the training set is generalization to new measurements for the same experimental conditions. This is sufficient, if the experimental conditions exhaustively cover the domain we would like to draw inferences about (consider the case of the representation of the five fingers in motor cortex: Diedrichsen et al. 2012) . However, in a domain such a sensory systems, the goal is typically to evaluate to what extent a braincomputational model can predict brain representations of arbitrary stimuli. This requires a higher level of generalization beyond the training set. A vision model, for example might be trained with responses to one sample of natural images and tested for generalization to responses to an independent (and nonoverlapping) sample from the same distribution of natural images.
Because the set of all natural images is so rich, this is a challenging generalization task (as illustrated by the difficulty of computer vision). An even more stringent test of the assumptions implicit to a model is to train the model on a sample from one population of images and test it on a sample from a different population of images (e.g. Eickenberg et al. 2017 ).
The prediction accuracy can be assessed in terms of whether it is significantly above chance level, whether it significantly differs from that of competing encoding models, and how close it comes come to the noise ceiling (the highest achievable accuracy given the noise in the data).
We can generalize claims about an encoding model to the extent that its predictions generalize.
If we want to conclude that the model can predict responses for the stimuli presented, we need not test the model with different stimuli (only with different response measurements elicited by the same stimuli). If we want to conclude that the model can predict responses to arbitrary natural stimuli, we need to test it with new arbitrary natural stimuli. The population of conditions the test set is a sample of defines the scope of the claims we can make (Hastie et al. 2009; .
We focus here on encoding and decoding models that are fitted to individual subjects' brains, so as be able to exploit fine-grained idiosyncratic patterns of activity that are unique to each subject. Within-subject prediction accuracy may support generalization to a population of stimuli, but it doesn't support generalization to the population of subjects. In some fields, such as lowlevel vision, researchers draw on prior knowledge and assume that results that hold for a few subjects will hold for the population. If we were instead to use our data to generalize our inferences to the population of subjects, we would either need to predict results for held-out subjects (which would make it impossible to exploit individually unique fine-grained activity patterns) or perform inference on the within-subject prediction accuracies with subject as a random effect.
The feature fallacy: Interpreting the success of a model as confirmation of its basis set of features Linear encoding models predict the measured activity profiles as linear combinations of the activity profiles of model features. When a model can explain the measured activity profiles, we might be tempted to interpret this as indicating that the model features are encoded in the measured responses. This interpretation is problematic because the same linear space can be spanned by many alternative basis sets of model features. In other words, the same model (in terms of the predictions made) can be expressed in many ways (by different feature sets), so the fact that the model explains the data does not provide evidence in favor of the particular feature set chosen.
Diedrichsen (2018) termed the interpretation in terms of the particular features used the "feature fallacy". This fallacy is arguably somewhat persistent in the neuroscience literature (Churchland et al. 2012) . Although the fact that multiple sets of basis vectors can span the same space is widely appreciated, it is not obvious how this applies in the context of a high-dimensional linear encoding model fitted with a prior on the weights. An encoding model with a 0-mean Gaussian prior on the weights predicts a Gaussian distribution of activity profiles (captured by the second moment of the activity profiles as the sufficient statistic) and a particular representational geometry (captured by the RDM). While there may be a unique set of orthogonal features that generates the distribution, there are infinitely many non-orthogonal feature sets that generate the same distribution (in conjunction with a Gaussian prior over the weights). The feature fallacy needs to be avoided in interpreting successful encoding models: Many alternative feature sets would have given equivalent results.
Box 2: Encoding Models: Benefits and Limitations
An encoding model predicts the response of each measurement channel (e.g. fMRI voxel) on the basis of properties of the experimental condition (e.g. sensory stimulus). Continuous brain maps can be obtained by fitting such a model to each response in turn. Responses are typically predicted as linear combinations of the features, rendering this approach closely related to classical univariate brain mapping. However, encoding models have several important benefits:
 More complex feature sets are used, often comprising thousands of descriptive features. Fitting the models therefore requires regularization. Typically, models are fitted using a penalty on the weights.
 Encoding models can have nonlinear components, such as the location and size of a visual receptive field.
 Models are tested for generalization to different experimental conditions (e.g. a different sample of visual stimuli).
 When sensory systems are studied, encoding models operate in the direction of information flow. They can then be used as a general method for testing brain-computational models, i.e. models that process sensory stimuli. A vision model, for example, can take a novel image as input and predict responses to that image in cortex.
Analyses using encoding models are also limited in a number of ways:
 The separate modeling of each response is inconsistent with the multivariate nature of neuronal population codes and noise, and is statistically suboptimal. Separate modeling of each response entails low power for testing and comparing models, for two reasons: (1) Single responses (e.g. fMRI voxels) may be noisy and the evidence is not combined across locations. (2) The analyses treat the responses as independent, thus forgoing the benefit exploited by linear decoding approaches to model the noise multivariately. This is important in fMRI, where nearby voxels have highly correlated noise. As spatial resolution increases, we face the combined challenge of more and noisier voxels. This renders mapping with proper correction for multiple testing very difficult. In addition, relating results between individuals is not straightforward.
 When model parameters are color-coded and mapped across the cortex, the resulting detailed maps are not straightforward to interpret. (1) Weight maps of linear models are problematic to interpret in encoding models for the same reason they are problematic to interpret for decoding models: because a predictor's weight depends on the other predictors present in the model (unless each predictor is orthogonal to all others). The required regularization further complicates weight interpretation. (2) Models are fit at many locations and voxels highlighted on the basis of model fits. Post-selection inference on parameters 161 is not usually performed. Because of these complications, results of fine-grained mapping across voxels are difficult to substantiate by formal inference.
Influential studies have met these challenges by focusing on single-subject analyses, acquiring a large amount of data in each subject, and limiting formal inference with correction for multiple testing to the overall explained variance of a model, with colors serving exploratory purposes.
Weights of linear models are not straightforward to interpret in either encoding or decoding models
Beyond interpretation of the overall success of an encoding or decoding model, researchers often want to dig deeper and interpret the fitted parameters of their models. In the context of a decoding model, the weights assigned to the voxels would seem to tell us where the information the decoder uses is located in the brain. Similarly, in the context of an encoding model, the weights of different model features promise to elucidate to what extent different model features are encoded in a brain region.
Unfortunately, the interpretation of the weights of linear models is not as straightforward as the simplicity of these models might suggest. A weight does not reflect the predictive power of an individual predictor (a measured brain response in decoding, a model features in encoding). Rather a weight reflects a predictor's contribution in the context of a particular linear model.
On the one hand, uninformative predictors can receive large positive or negative weights. For example, an fMRI voxel that does not by itself contain any information can have a large absolute weight in a linear decoder if it improves decoding accuracy by cancelling noise that the voxel shares with other voxels that do contain stimulus information ( Figure 1B ; Figure 2 ; Haufe et al. 2014) . In an encoding model, similarly, a model feature might contain no information about the modeled response and still receive a large absolute weight. For example, a set of semantic descriptors unrelated to faces might receive substantial weights in an encoding model fitted to an fMRI voxel that only responds to faces if the nonface semantic descriptors are capable, in combination, of capturing contextual variation that is correlated with the presence of faces.
On the other hand, informative predictors may receive weights that are small in absolute value or zero. For example, in fMRI, a voxel might receive zero weight when other voxels suffice for decoding when a weight penalty (especially a sparsity encouraging weight penalty, e.g. defined by the L1 norm of the weights) leads the fitting procedure to select among equally informative voxels ( Figure 2 ). Weight penalties can similarly suppress model feature weights in encoding models.
A related problem is performing statistical inference to test hypotheses about the weights (Taylor & Tibshirani 2015) . Systems and cognitive neuroscience has yet to develop a proper set of methods for hypothesis testing in this context. A simple remedy to the complications associated with the interpretation of fitted weights is to interpret only the accuracy of decoding and encoding models (and its significance level) and not the parameters of the models. In the context of decoding, this makes sense for local regions of interest corresponding, for example, to cortical areas, which we can test one by one for the presence of particular information. It can be generalized to brain mapping by applying the decoder (or more generally any multivariate analysis) within a searchlight that scans the brain for the effect of interest (Kriegeskorte et al. 2006 ). Like classical univariate brain mapping, this approach derives its interpretability from the fact that each location is independently subjected to the same analysis. However, instead of averaging local responses, the evidence is summarized using local multivariate statistics. In the context of encoding models, similarly, we can focus on each model's overall performance and on inferential comparisons among multiple models. illustrate the difficulty of interpreting decoder weights for a pair of voxels. In the first example (top row), only the top voxel contains signal (stimulus information, red) and the two voxels have independent noise. This scenario is unproblematic: both univariate mapping (second column from the left) and decoder weight maps detect the informative voxel (red). In the second example (second row), both voxels contain the same signal.
Here, univariate mapping and weight maps often work. However, the LASSO decoder, because of its preference for a sparse solution, may choose one of the voxels arbitrarily. In the third example (third row), only the top voxel contains signal and both voxels contain correlated noise. Univariate mapping correctly identifies the informative voxel. Linear decoders will give negative weight (blue) to the uninformative voxel, so as to cancel the noise.
The single-model-significance fallacy
When our goal is merely to detect information in a brain region, we don't interpret the model as a model of brain computation. This lowers the requirements for the model: It need not operate in the direction of information flow and it need not be neurobiologically plausible. The model is merely a statistical tool to sense a dependency. The choice of model in this scenario, will affect our sensitivity, and its structure is not entirely irrelevant to the interpretation; for example, decodability by a linear model tells us something about the format of the encoding. However, a single model will suffice to demonstrate the presence of information in a brain region.
When our goal is to gain insight into the computations the brain performs, a model has a more prominent role: it is meant to capture, at some level of abstraction, the computations occurring in the brain. We then require the model to operate in the appropriate direction and to be neurobiologically plausible (albeit abstracted). Examples of such models include encoding models of sensory responses and decoding models that predict behavioral responses from brain activity. Psychophysical models that skip the brain and predict behavioral responses directly from stimuli also fall into this class. In all these cases, finding that a model explains significant variance is a very low bar and tells us little as to whether the model captures the computational process.
The single-model-significance fallacy is to interpret the fact that a single model explains significant variance as evidence in favor of the model. A simple example that is widely understood is linear correlation. A significant linear correlation does demonstrate a dependency between two variables, but it does not demonstrate that the dependency is linear. Similarly, the fact that a complex encoding model explains significant variance in the responses of a brain region to a test set of novel stimuli does demonstrate that the brain region contains information about the stimuli, but it does not demonstrate that the encoding model captures the process that computes the encoding.
Even a bad model can explain significant variance, and usually will if it has a large number of parameters fitted to the data. In order to learn about the underlying brain computation, we need to consider multiple models, assess what proportion of the explainable (i.e. nonnoise) variance each explains at what level of generalization, and compare the models inferentially.
Representational interpretations require additional assumptions
Decoding and encoding models are often motivated by the goal to understand how the brain represents the world, as well as the animal's decisions, goals, plans, actions, and motor dynamics. Significant variance explained by encoding and decoding models demonstrates the presence of information. Interpreting this information as a representation (Dennett 1987) implies the additional claim that the brain activity serves the purpose to convey the information to other parts of the brain (Kriegeskorte 2011 , Diedrichsen & Kriegeskorte 2017 ). This functional interpretation is so compelling in the context of sensory systems that we sometimes jump too easily from findings of information to representational interpretations (de Wit et al. 2016, Ritchie et al. 2017 ). In addition to the presence of the information, its functional role as a representation implies that the information is read out by other regions, affecting downstream processing and ultimately behavior. A single study might not be able to demonstrate the full set of causal relationships, which might require manipulation of brain activity (Raizada & Kriegeskorte 2010), to fully substantiate such an interpretation. To the extent that we rely on prior assumptions based on the literature to justify a representational interpretation, it is worth reflecting on what these assumptions are and whether they hold for the particular region in question.
